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REVIEW
Abstract: Conversion disorders are a common cause of neurological disability, but the
diagnosis remains controversial and the mechanism by which psychological stress can result
in physical symptoms “unconsciously” is poorly understood. This review summarises research
examining conversion disorder from a neurobiological perspective. Early observations
suggesting a role for hemispheric specialization have not been replicated consistently. Patients
with sensory conversion symptoms have normal evoked responses in primary and secondary
somatosensory cortex but a reduction in the P300 potential, which is thought to reflect a lack
of conscious processing of sensory stimuli. The emergence of functional imaging has provided
the greatest opportunity for understanding the neural basis of conversion symptoms. Studies
have been limited by small patient numbers and failure to control for confounding variables.
The evidence available would suggest a broad hypothesis that frontal cortical and limbic
activation associated with emotional stress may act via inhibitory basal ganglia–thalamocortical
circuits to produce a deficit of conscious sensory or motor processing. The conceptual
difficulties that have limited progress in this area are discussed. A better neuropsychiatric
understanding of the mechanisms of conversion symptoms may improve our
understanding of normal attention and volition and reduce the controversy surrounding this
diagnosis.
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Introduction
The concept of “hysteria” or conversion disorder has always been controversial
(Halligan and David 1999), but there is no doubt that medically unexplained
neurological symptoms are common and cause considerable disability. About one
third of patients in neurology outpatient clinics have symptoms thought to be “non-
organic” in nature (Carson et al 2003; Snijders et al 2004) and these symptoms have
a poor prognosis for recovery (Carson et al 2003; Stone et al 2003). Despite early
concerns that many patients labeled with hysteria or conversion disorder are later
found to have an organic explanation for their symptoms (Slater 1965), more recent
studies suggest that the incidence of misdiagnosis is now low and that the stability of
a diagnosis of conversion disorder in well-investigated patients is high (Couprie et al
1995; Crimlisk et al 1998).
Conversion disorder is defined by DSM-IV as a deficit of sensory or motor function
that cannot be explained by a medical condition and where psychological factors are
judged to be associated with the deficit because symptoms are preceded by conflicts
or other stressors (APA 1994). It is differentiated from factitious disorder by the fact
that the symptom or deficit is not intentionally produced or feigned. In ICD-10,
conversion symptoms are classified as dissociative disorders (eg, dissociative motor
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At present, we have very limited understanding of the
mechanism by which psychological stress can “convert” into
physical symptoms. The concept of “konversion” was first
introduced by Freud and Breuer. Breuer speculated on
possible neurological mechanisms of conversion symptoms
when he discussed the “abnormal excitability” of the nervous
system and “weakness of resistances” in particular paths of
conduction (Freud and Breuer 1978). However, it is Freud’s
psychodynamic conceptualization of conversion disorder
that remains inextricably linked with the diagnosis in current
classifications. The lack of understanding of the neural
mechanism by which psychological stressors can
unconsciously result in physical symptoms is an important
reason for the ongoing controversy and stigma surrounding
the diagnosis.
Empirical research in this area has tended to lag behind
theoretical speculation (Halligan, Bass, et al 2000).
However, advances in functional imaging and neuro-
psychological testing offer the opportunity to narrow the
gap between psychoanalytical theory and neurobiological
explanations of conversion disorder. One difficulty facing
research in this field is the complexity of the conceptual
issues and variable ways in which terminology has been
used. To try to address this issue, we have attempted to define
the way in which important terms have been used in this
paper as precisely as possible (Table 1).
Table 1 Definitions and explanations of important terminology
Neglect occurs in patients with nondominant inferior parietal lobe damage. It is characterized by reduced awareness of
stimuli in the hemispace contralateral to the lesion. This reduced awareness is more marked when stimuli are present in








The term “consciousness” can be used in several ways (Zeman 2001), but in this paper we will refer to consciousness as
the qualitative, subjective dimension of experience. Thus, mental processes of which we are aware (eg, perceiving an
object, forming an intention to move) would be said to be “conscious” or “explicit”, whereas mental processes of which
we are not aware (eg, a pupillary light reflex, “blindsight”, implicit memory) would be said to be “unconscious” or
“implicit”. In this sense, consciousness is inextricably linked with attention and volition.
Attention William James provided a seminal definition of attention as “the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of
one out of what seem
 several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.
 Focalization, concentration, of
consciousness are of its essence” (James 1890). Current neuropsychological models see attention as a set of processes





Volition or “will” is the faculty of consciously making a choice or selecting an action (James 1890). “Willed actions” (eg,
walking on a slippery surface) can be differentiated from stereotyped, routine actions (eg, walking normally) by the fact
that we consciously attend to them and select them (Jahanshahi and Firth 1998). To perform a willed action we first form
an “intention” and then execute the action. Evidence from functional imaging and neurophysiology suggests that these
stages have a distinct neurological basis (Lau et al 2004; Waszak et al 2004). Deficits in volition, or translating intentions






Hierarchical processing refers to perception occurring via a stepwise process in which representations of sensory
information are initially simple and gradually become more abstract, holistic, and multimodal (Grill-Spector and Malach
2004). Thus we may refer to “early” processing (eg, the primary visual cortex) and “higher” or “downstream” processing
(eg, response to faces in the fusiform gyrus). Several functionally specialized parallel “streams” of hierarchical processing
may occur (eg, the dorsal and ventral streams in the visual system for spatial localization and object recognition




Terms such as “inhibition”, “excitation”, and “modulation” are often used rather imprecisely in the literature to refer to
the effect that one brain region or pathway may have on another. In fact, cortical and subcortical regions have rich,
reciprocal connections to other structures and function within complex networks and circuits that are not yet fully
understood. However, simplified models of the important ways in which specific regions may interact are useful to help us
form testable hypotheses about mechanisms of conversion symptoms. 
P300 potential The P300 potential is a late positive deflection in an event-related response, which occurs when subjects detect a “target”
stimulus, but not when they ignore it or fail to detect it. It is therefore thought to reflect conscious processing of the
stimulus (Picton 1992). 
Blindsight Blindsight occurs uncommonly in patients with damage to the primary visual cortex. Despite having no conscious
awareness of visual perception, these patients can perform simple visual discrimination tasks in forced choice (Weiskrantz
1996). This phenomenon is thought to reflect implicit visual processing in extrastriatal pathways.
NeglectNeuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(1) 15
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This review will describe early observational studies of
conversion symptoms, neurophysiological studies of
conversion disorder, and recent findings from the use of
functional neuroimaging to investigate both conversion
disorder and feigning. While this is not a systematic review
of all research in this area we have attempted to be as
comprehensive as possible. We conducted multiple searches
in Medline, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases using the
keywords “conversion”, “hysteria”, “dissociative”,
“medically unexplained”, or “non-organic illness”. We
obtained additional articles through our knowledge of
research in this area and from cross-referencing between
papers. Although related disorders including nonepileptic
seizures and psychogenic movement disorders may share a
similar etiology, the vast majority of research in this area
has focused on motor and sensory conversion symptoms.
We are confident that our discussion on functional imaging
includes all published studies of conversion disorders.
The study of conversion disorder from a neuropsychiatric
perspective should provide not only a greater understanding
of the etiology and management of this disorder, but also
valuable insights into normal cognitive processes, including
volition and attention.
Early observational findings
Ever since the late 19th century observers have commented
that hysterical hemianesthesia and hemiplegia tend to be
seen more commonly on the left than the right (Briquet 1859;
Jones 1908; Purves-Stewart 1924). This observation
appeared to be confirmed in 1977 when Stern found a
significantly higher proportion of left-sided conversion
symptoms in both left-handed and right-handed patients
(Stern 1977). Three hypotheses have been proposed to
explain this apparent laterality of conversion symptoms
(Axelrod et al 1980). Psychodynamic theorists suggested
that neurotic symptoms tend to be seen on the left because
of a psychological association between the right and left
sides and good and evil, respectively (Axelrod et al 1980).
There has, however, been little empirical support for this
so-called “evaluative hypothesis” (Roelofs et al 2000). The
“convenience hypothesis” suggested that patients would tend
to develop symptoms on the side that caused them the least
inconvenience; however, the predominance of left-sided
symptoms in left-handed patients argues against this (Stern
1977). The “hemispheric specialization” theory proposed a
neurobiological explanation for this apparent lateralization
(Roelofs et al 2000). It was suggested that the right
hemisphere has a particular role in emotional processing,
making it more likely to mediate affectively determined
symptoms (Stern 1977). However, recent neuroimaging
studies do not support the simplistic notion of right-sided
dominance for emotional processing (Wager et al 2003).
Recent studies have questioned whether conversion
symptoms are in fact lateralized at all (Roelofs et al 2000).
In response to this ongoing debate, Stone and colleagues
recently undertook a systematic review looking at more than
100 studies that addressed this issue (Stone et al 2002). They
found a small but significant increase in the incidence of
symptoms on the left side of the body (58% of patients) but
felt that the possibility of reporting bias made this finding
inconclusive (Stone et al 2002).
Another early approach to understanding the neural
mechanisms of conversion disorder was the study of patients
with conversion disorder associated with organic lesions.
Patients with nonepileptic seizures are more likely to have
right hemisphere pathology than those with epileptic
seizures, supporting possible right hemisphere involvement
in conversion symptoms (Devinsky et al 2001). In contrast
there have been case reports of conversion symptoms
occurring after injury or infarction of the left cerebral
hemisphere (Drake 1993). Other case studies have found
left-sided symptoms of probable hysterical origin to be
ameliorated by right anterior thalamotomy (Andy 1973).
A study of patients referred to a unit for treating
behavioral disorders after brain injury found that more than
30% of patients had symptoms suggestive of a hysterical
cause (Eames 1992). Diffuse insults such as anoxia or
hypoglycemia were much more common in those with
hysterical symptoms and indeed were almost invariably
present in these cases (Eames 1992). The authors suggested
that these findings may point to a role for the basal ganglia
and diencephalon (structures particularly vulnerable to such
insults) in the emergence of conversion symptoms. However,
patients with diffuse and localized brain injury may differ
in other neurological and psychological respects, suggesting
alternative explanations for this finding.
In summary, clinical studies have implicated various
brain regions in conversion disorders but many of these
findings are based only on case reports and have not been
consistently replicated. There is no strong evidence to
support the hypothesis of predominant right hemisphere
involvement. More recently, research has turned to other
techniques to investigate the neural basis of conversion
symptoms.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(1) 16
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Neurophysiological studies
In 1972, Ludwig proposed a model of conversion disorders
in which symptoms result from a dysfunction of attention
due to increased corticofugal inhibition of afferent
stimulation (Ludwig 1972). Such a theory was supported
by early findings of reduced somatosensory-evoked
responses from the affected compared with the normal leg
in a patient with hysterical hemianesthesia (Hernandez-Peon
et al 1963). However, this finding was not reliably
reproduced and normal evoked potentials are now thought
to be a hallmark of conversion disorder (Sierra and Berrios
1999). Research using magnetoencephalography (MEG) has
found that patients with psychogenic sensory loss also have
normal evoked activity in the secondary somatosensory
cortex (Hoechstetter et al 2002). Current understanding of
how somatosensory processing mediates conscious sensory
experience is limited. Both the primary and secondary
somatosensory cortices have been suggested to be of
particular importance (Johansen-Berg et al 2000; Schwartz
et al 2005), but these findings suggest that any altered
processing in patients with conversion symptoms must occur
further downstream.
More recently studies have focused on the P300
component of event-related response (Picton 1992). Lorenz
and colleagues designed a paradigm in which patients were
asked to verbally report the awareness of electrical stimuli
being applied to their hands during EEG recording (Lorenz
et al 1998). When healthy patients were asked to feign lack
of awareness of the stimulus on one side, a P300 component
of the event-related potential was seen. This was thought to
represent the processing of the stimulus and the active
withholding of a response. When the same paradigm was
used in a patient with sensory loss due to conversion disorder
no P300 response to stimulation of the affected limb was
seen. This provides the first evidence that conversion
disorder is neurophysiologically distinct from feigning, but
the evidence awaits replication. Interestingly, a lengthening
of latency and a decrease in amplitude of P300 waves has
also been described in patients with visual neglect due to
parietal lobe lesions (Lhermitte et al 1985). This lends some
support to the analogy between symptoms seen in right
parietal lesions and those in conversion disorder.
Functional neuroimaging
The emergence of functional neuroimaging has provided
new methods with which to test hypotheses about the neural
circuits underlying conversion symptoms (see Table 2).
However, the heterogeneous nature of symptoms seen in
conversion disorder and the varying methodologies used
makes comparison between studies difficult.
In 1995 the first reported functional imaging study was
conducted on a female nurse who had developed left-sided
hysterical paralysis and paresthesia (Tiihonen et al 1995).
Single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT)
studies were conducted while her left median nerve was
stimulated, both while she was symptomatic and when she
had recovered (6 weeks later). There was increased perfusion
in the right frontal lobe, and hypoperfusion in the right
parietal region when her symptoms were present (Tiihonen
et al 1995). Similar results were obtained when Marshall
and colleagues performed positron emission tomography
(PET) on a female patient with a left-sided paralysis that
met the criteria for conversion disorder (Marshall et al 1997).
Regional cerebral blood flow was compared between
episodes of rest, preparing to move, and attempting to move
both her unaffected and affected leg. When preparing to
move her affected left leg, there was activation of the left
lateral premotor cortex and both cerebeller hemispheres
relative to the resting condition, suggesting a readiness to
move. However, when this patient attempted to move her
affected leg, the right premotor and primary sensori-motor
cortex failed to activate normally, but there was increased
activation in the right anterior cingulate and right
orbitofrontal cortex. It was hypothesized that inhibitory
pathways involving the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior
cingulate may “disconnect” the premotor areas from the
primary motor cortex, preventing the patient’s conscious
intention from being translated into action. The authors
suggest that the activation seen when this patient was
preparing to move her affected limb provides evidence
against feigning. However, they do not address the issue of
whether preparing to move can itself be feigned.
More recently, attempts have been made to replicate
these case study findings in larger groups of patients. Yazici
and Kostakoglu used SPECT to measure resting cerebral
blood flow in five patients with astasia–abasia. They found
that four of these five patients had decreased perfusion in
their left temporal areas and one patient had decreased
perfusion in their left parietal lobe compared with the right
side (Yazici and Kostakoglu 1998). However, significant
methodological issues question the validity of these findings.
Most importantly, the contralateral hemisphere does not
provide an adequate control condition, particularly as
patients’ symptoms were bilateral. In addition, the patients
studied had heterogeneous symptoms and many hadNeuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(1) 17
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previous or current psychiatric conditions requiring
medication or ECT.
Some of these methodological problems were addressed
in a study by Vuilleumier and colleagues in 2001
(Vuilleumier et al 2001). SPECT studies were performed
on seven right-handed patients with strictly unilateral loss
of motor function (with or without associated sensory loss)
who had no other psychiatric or medical conditions. Scans
were repeated in a subset of patients, once their symptoms
had resolved allowing them to act as their own controls
(Vuilleumier et al 2001). This study was also unique in using
controlled stimulation with passive vibration rather than
actual movements to activate the sensorimotor cortex.
Vibration is known to activate motor and sensory cortical
areas via proprioceptive pathways (Seitz and Roland 1992).
The authors argue that this may reduce confounding due to
ambiguity of instructions, strategy, degree of effort, and
“conflict reaction” seen when patients are asked to perform
voluntary movements. The data obtained were analysed
using both statistical parametric mapping and region-of-
interest segmentation, comparing activation in 20 pre-
defined anatomical regions. Both methods of analysis
showed reduced blood flow in the contralateral thalamus,
caudate, and putamen during passive vibration when patients
were symptomatic compared with when their symptoms had
resolved (Vuilleumier et al 2001). They also found that lower
activation in the contralateral caudate was a predictor of
poor recovery. The authors comment that the basal ganglia
and thalamus are strategically placed in neuronal circuits to
modulate sensory and motor signals and thus may affect
conscious sensory processing or willed action. This theory
is supported by the observational studies of brain-injured
patients with conversion disorder described above (Eames
1992), and is consistent with the proposed role of cortical–
subcortical circuits in volition (Spence and Frith 1999). The
caudate nucleus has direct limbic inputs from the amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex, suggesting a possible link with
previous reports of increased orbitofrontal activation in
conversion symptoms (Vuilleumier et al 2001). The authors
hypothesize that emotional stressors act via limbic inputs
from the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala to modulate
basal ganglia–thalamocortical circuits, leading to a selective
deficit of willed action (Vuilleumier et al 2001).
More recently, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) has been used to study the Blood Oxygenation Level
Dependent (BOLD) response to sensory stimulation in
four patients with nondermatomal somatosensory deficits
(Mailis-Gagnon et al 2003). These patients met diagnostic
criteria for conversion disorder but also had chronic pain in
the affected limbs. Unperceived stimuli applied to the
affected limb were associated with a different pattern of
BOLD response to both innocuous and noxious stimuli,
Table 2 Functional imaging studies of conversion disorder
Imaging Patients’ Control Perfusion changes associated with
Authors modality symptoms N condition Paradigm  conversion symptoms
Tiihonen SPECT L hemiparesis and 1 Same patient Stimulation of ↑ R frontal cortex
et al 1995 hemisensory loss when recovered L median nerve ↓ R parietal cortex
Marshall PET L hemiparesis 1 Unaffected side Attempting to move  ↓ R premotor and primary sensorimotor cortex
et al 1997 ↑ R anterior cingulate cortex and
 R orbitofrontal cortex
Yazici and SPECT Astasia–abasia 5 Contralateral Resting ↓ L temporal and parietal cortex
Kostakoglu hemisphere
1998
Vuilleumier SPECT Hemiparesis 7 Same patients Passive vibration ↓ contralateral thalamus and striatum
et al 2001 +/– sensory loss when recovered stimulation
Mailis-Gagnon fMRI Nondermatomal 4 Unaffected limb Innocuous and ↑ rostral anterior cingulate cortex
et al 2003 somatosensory noxious stimulation ↓ thalamus, anterior cingulated (posterior
deficits region), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior
insula
Werring fMRI Visual loss 5 Healthy controls Visual stimulation ↓ visual cortex
et al 2004 ↑ L inferior frontal, L insula, L striatum, thalami,
midbrain, L posterior cingulate
Spence PET L arm weakness 2 Healthy controls Movement of joystick ↓ L DLPFC
et al 2000
Abbreviations: DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; L, left; PET, positron emission tomography; SPECT, single-photon
emission computed tomography; R, right.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(1) 18
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compared with perceived stimuli applied to the unaffected
limb. Unperceived stimuli failed to activate the anterior
insula, thalamus, anterior cingulate cortex, and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, but caused increased activation in the
rostral anterior cingulate cortex. Unperceived stimuli also
caused deactivation in primary and secondary somato-
sensory areas, posterior parietal, and prefrontal cortex.
However, the generalizability of these findings is limited
by the prominence of chronic pain in these patients, and the
interpretation of deactivation seen on fMRI remains
controversial (Hutchinson et al 1999).
Another fMRI study compared five patients with
medically unexplained visual loss meeting criteria for
conversion disorder with normal controls (Werring et al
2004). During visual stimulation, these patients had reduced
activation in their visual cortex and increased activation in
their left inferior frontal cortex, left insula, left corpus
striatum, bilateral thalami, limbic structures, midbrain, and
the left posterior cingulate cortex. The authors note that the
networks activated in these patients are similar to those that
are activated in blindsight and suggest this may imply a
shift towards implicit visual processing in hysterical
blindness (Werring et al 2004). Alternatively, they speculate
that this activation may represent complex visual processing
resulting in inhibition of primary visual areas. It is, however,
difficult to interpret this apparent left-sided activation given
that patients with both left-sided and right-sided visual
deficits were included in this study.
The findings of all of these functional imaging studies
are summarized in Table 2.
Conversion disorder versus
feigning
Functional imaging has also been used to compare those
with conversion disorder with others who have been
instructed to feign their symptoms. Spence et al used PET
to compare three patients with weakness due to a conversion
syndrome with both normal controls and controls instructed
to feign weakness (Spence et al 2000). During a simple
motor task, those with conversion syndrome had hypo-
activation of their left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(LDLPFC) compared with both normal controls and feigners
(Spence et al 2000). This would be consistent with the known
role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in volition and
willed action (Frith et al 1991; Jahanshahi et al 1995).
However, while the patients in this study were euthymic,
they all had a past history of depression, which has been
suggested as an alternative explanation for the left frontal
hypo-activity seen (Vuilleumier et al 2001).
An alternative, novel approach in this field has been the
use of hypnosis as a model for conversion disorders.
Hypnosis can produce a compelling experience of subjective
paralysis and thus may have some conceptual links with
conversion disorder. In order to establish hypnotically
induced paralysis as a model for conversion disorder,
Halligan and colleagues replicated the methods used in an
earlier imaging study of a patient with conversion disorder
and demonstrated that a subject with hypnotic paralysis
activated similar brain areas when they tried to move the
affected limb as those seen in conversion disorder (Halligan,
Athwal, et al 2000). Based on these results Ward et al (2003)
conducted a study using 12 healthy volunteers who each
had 2 different paralysis conditions created under hypnosis:
a subjectively experienced paralysis, and a condition where
subjects were aware there was no paralysis but were
instructed to feign weakness. PET scanning measured
regional cerebral blood flow at rest and on attempting to
move the affected left leg. Using Statistical Parametric
Mapping analysis there was no significant difference in
activation during attempts to move between the two paralysis
conditions (Ward et al 2003). However, a small volume
correction analysis based around a region of interest from a
previous study (Spence et al 2000) did find increased
activation in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(LVLPFC) during feigning compared with subjectively
experienced paralysis (Ward et al 2003). The authors argue
that this is broadly consistent with the finding of Spence et
al (2000) of activation of the LDLFC during feigning, not
only because of the proximity of these regions, but also
because Spence et al reported a separate peak of significant
activation in the LVLPFC. The LVLPFC may therefore have
a role in the conscious volitional inhibition seen in feigning
(Ward et al 2003). This would be consistent with functional
imaging studies of deception, which have found lying to be
associated with increased activity in the VLPFC (Spence et
al 2001). It should, however, be noted that the effect seen in
the Ward et al study was small and only significant in one
of the two methods of analysis used. While the hypnosis
paradigm avoids many of the confounders and co-
morbidities that have limited other studies, it remains
uncertain how far these results can be generalized. The
neurobiological processes involved in such short-lived,
experimental conditions may be very different to those
involved in the more chronic and complex cases seen in
clinical practice (Ward et al 2003).Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(1) 19
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Conclusions
Conversion disorders are common and cause considerable
morbidity but, despite attracting ongoing controversy and
theoretical interest, there has been relatively little empirical
research in this field.
Early neuropsychiatric studies of conversion symptoms
focusing on the apparent importance of laterality and patients
with brain lesions failed to produce consistent findings.
Neurophysiological studies have suggested that conversion
disorder results from changes in higher-order cortical
processing. The development of functional neuroimaging
has provided a new paradigm with which to study the neural
basis of conversion, but the few studies to date have often
been limited by small sample sizes and significant
methodological issues, and there have been some
inconsistencies in their findings.
At present the evidence available suggests a broad
hypothesis that frontal cortical and limbic activation
associated with emotional stress may act via inhibitory basal
ganglia–thalamocortical circuits to produce a deficit of
conscious sensory or motor processing. Functional imaging
and neurophysiological evidence to support the distinction
between conversion and factitious disorders is limited.
Difficulties with classification and terminology continue
to hamper research in this area. The place of conversion
disorder in psychiatric classification depends on its
presumed unconscious psychological mechanism and so
necessarily relies on clinicians’ judgments which may be
subjective and difficult to validate (Broome 2004). This has
led some authors to question the usefulness of a distinction
between conversion and factitious disorders (Austen and
Lynch 2004; Shapiro and Teasell 2004). However, we would
argue that there is an important difference in phenomenology
between these two disorders. Current theories of con-
sciousness suggest a continuum of awareness of intentions
or perceptions that may fluctuate over time (Zeman 2001).
We would suggest that the functional anatomical basis of
symptoms is likely to differ between patients with different
levels of awareness and that this is an important area to study.
To use functional imaging more effectively to understand
the psychopathology of conversion disorder, we first need
a clear cognitive model of the information processing deficits
that underlie these symptoms. At present, our understanding
of the “neural correlate of consciousness” is limited, making
it harder to propose cognitive models of “unconscious”
processes. Studies of the visual system have so far provided
the best understanding of the neural basis of awareness.
Blindsight and visual neglect, like hysterical blindness, are
both characterized by reduced awareness of visual stimuli
with preservation of some aspects of visual processing.
Indeed, the one functional imaging study of hysterical
blindness found activations in very similar areas to those
previously reported in blindsight (Werring et al 2004).
Comparisons between these syndromes may provide useful
insights into relevant cognitive processes and suggest
hypotheses about brain regions which may be important in
conversion symptoms.
Studies with larger numbers of patients and better
attempts to control for confounders are needed to further
test these hypotheses. Despite increasingly sophisticated
study designs and imaging techniques, conceptual problems
may continue to limit progress in this area. However, by
beginning to understand the neurobiology of conversion
disorder we may gain valuable insights into the cognitive
processes involved in attention and volition and reduce some
of the controversy and stigma associated with this common
condition.
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